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Abstract 
 
Mobile ad-hoc network has become a very important field of study for students and 
researchers owing to its wide application. In mobile ad-hoc network all nodes are responsible for 
routing and forwarding of packets, hence all nodes are required to act selflessly for proper 
functioning of mobile ad-hoc network. The presence of selfish behavior in a node can degrade the 
performance of the mobile ad hoc network to a large extent. Several works have been done for 
identification and punishment of the misbehaving nodes in mobile ad hoc network. We propose 
here a method where some selected neighbors are participated in detecting misbehaving nodes in 
power effective manners. These neighbors participating in selfish node detection are chosen 
randomly. It also alerts all other nodes about the misbehaving links in the network. The simulation 
studies show that this does the job efficiently with less power consumption in the network. The 
power effectiveness of the algorithm also reduces the number of misbehaving nodes because many 
nodes show misbehavior to save their power. 
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1.1 Introduction to MANET 
  Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks (referred to as MANETs)), are wireless networks for 
communication. These are increasingly utilized in the Commercial, Military, and Private sector as 
portable wireless computers have become more and more accessible. Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks allow 
users for access and exchange of information independent of their geographic location or proximity to 
infrastructure [7]. Opposed to the infrastructure networks, all nodes in MANETs are mobile and they 
have dynamic connections. Unlike others mobile, MANETs do not need a fixed infrastructure. This 
offers a decentralized character to the network. Because of decentralization, the networks are more 
flexible and robust. 
 MANETs are widely ranging used in many critical situations: search and rescue operation 
is an ideal application. Such cases have characteristics of lack of installed infrastructure for 
communications. This may be due to all of the equipment’s were destroyed, or may be because the 
region is too remote. Rescuers must be able to communicate between them in order to make the 
best use of their energy, also to maintain safety. By automatic establishment of a data network with 
the equipment’s for communications that the rescuers are carrying already, their job becomes 
easier. 
 
Fig 1.1 Mobile ad hoc network among Vehicles 
 A commercial application for MANETs includes ubiquitous computing. By using 
computers to forward data for others, data networks can be extended far beyond the usual reach of 
any installed infrastructure. Networks can be made more widely available and easier to use. 
 Another application of MANETs is sensor networks. This is a network made up of a very 
large number of small sensors. These can be used to detect various properties of an area. For 
example: temperature, pressure, toxins, pollutions, etc. The capabilities of each sensor are very 
limited, and each relies on others to forward data to a central computer. Individual sensors are 
constrained in their computing capability and are prone to failure and loss. Mobile ad-hoc sensor 
networks could be the key to future homeland security. 
 However MANETs are not perfect. The challenges of scalability, mobility, bandwidth 
limitations, and power constraints of these networks have not been completely eliminated to date. 
 At the center of these difficulties with MANETs are issues concerning the determination of 
the rules (protocols) governing the communication between the entities (nodes) in the network, 
One important question is how to facilitate the dynamic discovery of the most efficient route 
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between two nodes within the network. It is important to take care of the mobility of the nodes and 
the lack of a fixed topology in the network. 
1.2 Introduction to Sybil attack 
 The Sybil attack in computer security is an attack wherein a reputation system is subverted 
by forging identities in peer-to-peer networks.  It is named after the subject of the book Sybil, a case 
study of a woman with multiple personality disorder. The name was suggested in or before 2002 by 
Brian Zill at Microsoft Research.  The Sybil attack can be used to attack several types of protocols in 
wireless ad-hoc networks as described in varieties of literatures.  
 It is possible to control Internet polls by using multiple IP addresses to submit votes, to gain 
advantage in any results of a chain letter- a well-known and potentially major problem in real-world 
elections. A Sybil attack is also used by companies to increase the Google PageRank rating of the 
pages of their customers. Some particular search terms can be linked to unexpected results for 
political gain. Reputation systems are usual targets for Sybil attackers including real-world systems 
like eBay .Spammers can use Sybil attack to gain access to multiple accounts on free email systems. 
Peer-to-peer computing systems using voting to verify correct answers, like SETI@home, are also 
prone to accept false solutions from a Sybil attacker. Ad hoc mobile network routing can be 
manipulated when a Sybil attacker appears to be many different mobile nodes at once. In systems that 
provide anonymity between peers, as Tor, the Sybil attack is generally able to reveal the initiator of a 
connection and there is no defence against this attack. It also allows free riding in services in 
cooperative file storage systems such as Pastiche. 
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2.1 Existing Solutions to Sybil Attack 
Several approaches have been proposed in various research papers against Sybil attack. The 
following graph shows the summery [10].  
 
 
Fig 2.1 General solution approach vs. no. of citations 
2.1.1 Trusted Certification- 
 It has proven that trusted certification is the only approach which is potent to completely 
eradicate Sybil attacks. That is why; it is cited as the most common solution. However, trusted 
certification is dependent on a centralized authority whose job is to ensure that each entity is assigned 
exactly one identity which is indicated by possession of a certificate. Factually, the author does not 
offer any method for ensuring this uniqueness, and in practical scenarios it must be done manually or 
by in-person process. This can be costly to create a performance bottleneck in large-scale systems. 
Moreover, to become effective, the certifying authority must ensure that lost or stolen identities are 
discovered and revoked [10]. If the performance and security implications can be solved, then this 
approach can eliminate the Sybil attack [10].  
2.1.2 No Solution 
Though many researchers know Sybil attack as a potential problem, they present no solution to it 
in their work, and there are many papers published to cite this.  
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2.1.3 Resource Testing 
The aim of resource testing is to try to find out if a number of identities possess fewer resources 
than they would possess if they were independent. These tests consist of checks for computational 
ability, storage capacity, and network bandwidth, also limited IP addresses. Cornelli et al. and 
Freedman and Morris mainly propose testing for IP addresses in various domains or autonomous 
systems. Needing heterogeneous IP addresses although provide prevention for some attacks but fail to 
discourage others (such as zombie networks) and limits the use domain of an application. Douceur 
has proven the ineffectiveness of resource tests, but many suggest them as a minimal Sybil attack 
defence. For a variety of applications this is not sufficient if an attacker can get enough identities for 
causing a successful attack, though expensive. In the Tor communication system, for example, only 
two identities are required for an attack on anonymity [10]. In a type of resource test, Yu et al.’s 
Sybil-Guard technique relies on limited availability of real-world friendship edges between nodes. 
However, the p2p application in use may have little intersection with the real-world friends 
represented in the graph. These friendship relationships can also be expensive to build since the 
proposal needs out-of-band key sharing and a stronger trust relationship than is typical in social 
networks.  
2.1.4 Recurring Costs and Fees 
A variation of resource testing, in many papers identities are re-validated periodically using 
resource tests. The approach puts a limit on the number of Sybil attackers with limited resources can 
introduce in a time period. However, in many applications very few Sybil identities are required for 
an effective attack. Also in these papers, computational power is tested. Computational power mostly 
involves a one-time cost (for example, the purchase of computing hardware), so an attacker could 
recover over time even a high initial cost of claiming a large number of identities. Awerbuch and 
Scheidler suggest the use of Turing tests, for example CAPTCHAs, to impose recurring fees. 
Dragovic et al. require certification of identities, but this certification is not trusted; rather, it is 
viewed as a way of imposing identity creation costs. Gatti et al.’s “Sufficiently Secure Peer-to-Peer 
Networks” uses an economic, game-theoretical approach to examine when attacks on censorship 
resistant networks are cost-effective. For many applications, recurring fees can incur a cost to the 
Sybil attack that increases linearly with the total number of identities participating. 
2.1.5 Trusted Devices 
Similar to certification authorities, entities in an application can be linked in to a particular 
hardware device securely. Analogous to any central authority handing out cryptographic certificates, 
there are no special methods of preventing an attacker from obtaining multiple devices other than 
manual intervention. However, cost of acquiring multiple devices may be high. 
 
 
13 | P a g e  
 
2.1.5 Application Domains :--- 
 
2.1.5.1 Mobile Networks 
Observing location can distinguish between different devices and limits of realistic mobility 
can constrain attacker movement. For an attacker having a single device, all Sybil identities will 
always appear to move together. The defence is not applicable beyond mobile networks, and it does 
not protect against a single entity controlling multiple devices, each having a non-recurring cost.  
2.1.5.2 Auditing 
 In some cases, audit can be used to determine the correctness of identity behaviour. If audit is 
cheap, the Sybil attack has little benefit: for instance, a large number of apparently independent 
identities cannot successfully convince another entity that they have factored a large number unless 
they have actually done so.  
2.1.5.3 Cash Economies 
 In these, identities explicitly exchange currency for desired goods or services. In most cases, 
such applications are not susceptible to the Sybil attack, since they do not rely on redundancy.  
2.1.5.4 Reputation Systems 
For many p2p systems, including ad hoc networks and online markets, reputation systems have 
received a significant amount of attention as a solution for mitigating the effects of malicious peers. 
In an important work, Cheng and Friedman evaluated the vulnerability of reputation systems to the 
Sybil attack, classifying them as symmetric or asymmetric approaches.  
2.1.5.5 Symmetric Reputation 
 A symmetric reputation system is one in which an identity’s reputation depends solely on the 
topology of the trust graph, and not the naming or identity of nodes. An attacker that wishes to 
increase its reputation simply uses Sybil identities to create a copy of the existing graph representing 
trust relationships. A symmetric reputation system cannot distinguish original nodes from the copies, 
and thus some Sybil node has reputations equal or better to any original node.  
2.1.5.6 Asymmetric Reputation Systems 
 In asymmetric reputation systems, there are specifically trusted nodes from which all 
reputation values propagate. Alternatively, each entity separately computes a trust value along their 
unique paths to every other identity in the system. Since the trusted nodes cannot be impersonated, no 
Sybil attacker can create a duplicate graph as explained in the symmetric case. This trust value can 
change over time as the entity interacts with and observes the behaviour of different identities. 
Asymmetric reputation systems can be effective at raising the cost of Sybil attacks because attackers 
are forced to build up trust before effectively launching attacks. Unfortunately, these systems 
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inevitably penalize newcomers who must prove themselves by offering benefits before getting 
anything in return.  
2.2 Role of Reputation System- 
Sonja Buchegger, University of California at Berkeley Jean-Yves Le Boudec, EPFL-IC-LCA in their 
paper published in IEEE Communications Magazine • July 2005 suggestif Self-polishing of mobile 
ad hoc network by réputation system. Reputation systems can be used to cope with any kind of 
misbehavior as long as it is observable. 
   The goal of a detection and reputation system is to enable nodes to adapt to changes in the network 
environment caused by misbehaving nodes. This is achieved by the following functions. 
 Monitoring 
 Reputation 
 Response 
 
2.2.1 Monitoring 
Monitoring systems detect misbehavior that can be distinguished from regular behavior by 
observation. Nodes can automatically learn about new misbehavior in analogy to the human immune 
system. 
2.2.2 Reputation 
The terms reputation and trust have been used for various concepts, also synonymously. 
Reputation here is to mean the performance of a node in participating in the base protocol as seen by 
other nodes. For mobile ad hoc networking this means participation in routing and forwarding. By 
trust we mean the performance of a node in the policing protocol that protects the base protocol, here 
reliability as a witness to provide honest reports.  
2.2.3 Response 
Detection and reputation systems aim at isolating nodes that are deemed misbehaving by not 
using them for routing and forwarding, and most also isolate them additionally by denying them 
service.  
2.3 Features of a Reputation System 
 
2.3.1 Representation of Information and classification:-  
These determine how monitored events are stored and translated into reputation ratings, and how 
ratings are classified for response. Use of second-hand information, Reputation systems can either 
rely exclusively on their own observations or also consider information obtained by others. 
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2.3.2 Trust:- 
The use of trust influences the decision of using second-hand information. The design choices are 
about how to build trust, out-of-band trust vs. building trust on experience, how to represent trust, and 
how to manage the influence of trust on responses.  
2.3.3 Redemption and secondary response:-  
When a node has been isolated, it can no longer be observed. The question of how those nodes 
should be rated over time is addressed by these two features. If the misbehavior of a node is 
temporary, a redemption mechanism ensures that it can come back to the network. That is, however, 
desirable to prevent recidivists from exploiting a redemption mechanism. This can be achieved by 
secondary response, meaning a quicker response to a recurring threat, in analogy to the human 
immune system.  
2.3.4 Liar Detection 
In this scenario nodes not only misbehave in forwarding (and routing), but also in the reputation 
system itself, by spreading spurious ratings. Untrustworthy nodes can have different strategies to 
publish their falsified first-hand information when attempting to influence reputation ratings (e.g., 
when they want to discredit regular nodes).If the lies are big, they will not pass the deviation test of 
CONFIDANT. A more sophisticated alternative is stealthy lies. Although nodes do not know the 
content of the reputation ratings held by others, they could try to infer from published first-hand 
information and then lie only enough to just pass the deviation test. CORE does not consider negative 
ratings, so only flattering has an impact. SORI are vulnerable to liars that are cooperative when 
forwarding. Context-aware detection copes with single liars or very small collusions by majority 
voting. Path-rater has no defense against liars.  
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  CHAPTER 3 
RSNAM (RANDOM SELECTION OF 
NEIGHBORS FOR MONITORING WITH ALERT 
MECHANISM) 
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There are many algorithms are existing in different literatures for implementing reputation 
system in mobile ad hoc network. These have been implemented as an add-on to the DSR 
[Dynamic Source Routing] routing protocol. In MANET [Mobile Ad-hoc network] the nodes have 
to cooperate to find path between nodes [route discovery, route maintenance etc.].The successful 
design of a reputation system is decided by how the system is free from misbehaving nodes where 
misbehaviors are packet dropping, identity spoofing and packet modification.  
3.1 Existing algorithms: 
 
3.1.1 WATCHDOG & PATHRATER-Marti proposed this in 2000[4, 18]: 
   In this each node contains two components watchdog and path-rater. Each node operates in 
promiscuous mode. It maintains a buffer of recently sent packets, compares it with overheard 
packet, if same removes from buffer else decrements the reputation value[of next hop node] after a 
timeout. If the reputation falls below the threshold the node is considered selfish and the path-rater 
relieves the node from burden of forwarding packet. 
3.1.2 CONFIDANT (Cooperation of Nodes: Fairness in Dynamic Ad hoc NeTwork) - Buchegger 
proposed this in 2002[1, 4, 12]: 
 The protocol adds a trust manager and a reputation system to the watchdog and path rater 
scheme. The trust manager evaluates the events reported by the watchdog and issues alarms to 
warn the nodes in the friends list regarding malicious nodes 
3.1.3 CORE (Collaborative Reputation mechanism)-Michiardi proposed this in 2002[1, 4,  19]: 
The reputation metric is computed based on data monitored by the local entity and some 
information provided by the other nodes involved in each operation. The reputation value is 
proportional to amount of resources the node can utilize. 
3.1.4 OCEAN (Observation based Cooperation Enforcement in Ad hoc Networks)-Bansal 
proposed this in 2003[1, 20]: 
 The routing decisions are based on direct observation of neighboring nodes behavior and it 
completely disallows the exchange of second hand reputation. It also employs a punishment 
scheme by completely rejecting the traffic from the misbehaving nodes. 
3.1.5 Locally Aware Reputation System (LARS)-Hu proposes this in 2006[14]: 
  Reputation of nodes is derived by using direct observation. When a node detects a packet 
drop behavior of its neighbor then the reputation value of the neighbor gets decremented. When a 
selfish node is identified then its k-hop neighbors become aware of the selfishness, where k is a 
parameter which is adaptive to the security requirement of the network. To avoid false accusation 
and the associated trust issues, conviction of the selfish node is valid only if m different neighbors 
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accuse, where m – 1 is an upper bound on the number of malicious nodes in the neighborhood. The 
success of this relies on proper selection of m. 
3.1.6 PLRSA-Promiscuous Listening Routing Security Algorithm-Li proposed this in 2006[21]: 
  It Enable the promiscuous mode of every mobile host to intercept all the packets passing 
through the mobile host regardless of the destination address of the packet. Once when a node 
performs malicious behaviors, such as maliciously dropping of data packets or fabricating the 
spurious packets, the other nearby nodes may detect the spiteful behaviors. If the value of trust 
level is lower than a threshold defined by PLRSA then the node is considered as a malicious and 
further the malicious nodes are not considered for routing. 
3.1.7 E-Hermes-Zouridaki proposed this in 2009[1]: 
 Each node determines the trustworthiness of the other nodes with respect to reliable packet 
forwarding by combining first-hand trust information obtained independently of other nodes and 
second-hand trust information obtained via recommendations from other nodes. 
3.1.8 LMRSA- Local Monitoring based Reputation System with Alert-Gopalakrishnan Proposed 
this in 2010[3]: 
 This scheme derives the trustworthiness based on the direct observation experienced by a 
node from its next hop neighbors and also it does not exchange the trust values with the rest of the 
nodes in the network. This scheme generates an explicit alert and sends it to source node of the 
monitored transmission, whenever it declares its next hop node as a misbehaving node. This 
enables the packet originating node to select an alternate route for its current transmission, which 
in turn increases the overall network throughput. 
3.1.9 CARS (Collaborative Alert in a Reputation System): Gopalakrishnan proposed this in 
2011[2]: 
 Based on neighborhood monitoring approach to detect and isolate the colluding packet 
droppers with explicit alert mechanism. 
3.1.10 Neighborhood Monitoring Based Collaborative Alert Mechanism [1] proposed by the same 
author in 2011 which acts as a base paper for our research: 
 It differs from others by means of introducing a timeout approach for detecting the active 
neighbors before monitoring the transmissions which involves it. This approach does the timely 
generation of an explicit route error packet to inform about the misbehaving link, reintroduction of 
misbehaving nodes and dissemination of misbehaving node information through route request 
packet in a unique manner. 
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3.2 Summary of existing algorithm: 
 
3.2.1 Next-hop monitoring:- 
 The algorithms 1,2,3,4,7,8  are based on next hop monitoring, in which the nodes except 
the destination and its previous hop in the source route of the packet has to monitor the behavior of 
its next hop in order to identify the node misbehavior. 
3.2.1 Neighborhood Monitoring:- 
 The algorithms 5, 6,9,10 are based on neighborhood monitoring adds flexibility in 
monitoring by allowing a node to monitor the neighboring transmissions even if those 
transmissions does not involve it. 
3.3 Drawbacks of existing algorithms:- 
 Following drawbacks exists more in 1
st
 category algorithms and less in 2
nd
 category 
algorithms- 
3.3.1 Ambiguous Collision: 
 One node cannot overhear the transmission of the next node due to the concurrent 
transmission in its neighborhood and hence thinks it to be selfish. 
3.3.2 Receiver Collision- 
 The transmission of the next node is overheard by the node but due to collision it did not 
receive then malicious node will not resend it. 
3.3.3 False Misbehavior:- 
 The claim by a node is that a node has behaved selfishly although it is not the case. 
3.3.4 Limited Transmission Power:- 
 A node makes its power so low that it can be overheard by the neighbor but cannot reach the 
receiver. 
3.3.5 Multiple Colliding Nodes- 
 Two nodes generally collide to mischief. 
 Both category 1 and category 2 algorithms are having their advantages and disadvantages. 
We can exploit the benefits of both the kinds by developing a kind of mixed approach. We call it 
as Random Selection of Neighbors for monitoring with Alert Mechanism against node 
misbehavior [RSNAM] in MANET. The aim of this algorithm is to achieve a drawbacks 
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resistant reputation system in power effective manner. It differs from algorithm in our base 
paper in terms of number of neighbors of a node engaged in overhearing a node’s transmission. 
3.4 RSNAM: Detailed of our proposed algorithm:- 
 
 As in our base paper each node will have a NCL [Neighborhood Connectivity List] which 
will be having data structure as follows- 
 The NCL should have the list of all the neighbors of a node. When a node 1
st
 time 
overhears another node it adds it to the NCL with timestamp value. It will also contain an entry for 
it-self with flag, mode, & ctr initialized to 0.We add 3 fields more in this list to achieve our 
objective. 
 It also consists of three main components namely a Monitor, Reputation System and a Path 
Manager as an add-on to the existing Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) protocol functionality as in 
NMCAM. 
 Whenever a node overhears a packet from the neighboring node for the first time then the 
neighboring node information is stored in the Neighbor Connectivity List (NCL) along with the 
timestamp at which the packet is overheard. Its reputation value is initialized to 0. 
 The timestamp and the trust value are updated for the subsequent packet overhearing from 
the neighboring node. 
 If the node is overhearing then its flag is set. The mode is set 1 if it is 0 else vice versa after 
each overhearing by a node. After a time slice the flag is reset. 
 For subsequent overhearing by a node the ctr is incremented by 2 if mode is 0 or by 1 if 
mode is 1.After a regular time slice the ctr is decremented by 1 if the mode is 1 or incremented by1 
if mode is 0.This is in order to achieve randomness in ctr value. 
 For subsequent overhearing by a node the ctr is incremented by 2 if mode is 0 or by 1 if 
mode is 1.After a regular time slice the ctr is decremented by 1 if the mode is 1 or incremented by1 
if mode is 0.This is in order to achieve randomness in ctr value. 
 A node will be allowed to overhear if it is the sender or its counter value is even. 
  If the Trust Manager receives a positive event from the Monitor then the trust value of the 
corresponding node is incremented by 1.  
 In the case of a negative event reported from the monitor then the trust manager decrements 
the trust value by 2 for packet dropping misbehavior and by 4 for packet modification and identity 
spoofing misbehavior. 
MODE IP ADD MAC ADD TIME STAMP REPUTATION FLAG CTR 
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 Once a trust value of a node reaches a Negative Threshold limit then the faulty flag is set 
for it and any packet to and from the misbehaving node will be rejected. 
The faulty list [contains nodes with faulty flag on] is disseminated using a RREQ packet so 
that the malicious node information is widely spread over the network as well as it does not incur 
extra control overhead for disseminating the faulty list. 
 When a node receives a RREQ packet, it extracts the faulty list from it and sets the 
suspicious flag on for the nodes in the faulty list in its NCL for the 1
st
 time or sets the faulty flag on 
for the suspected nodes. 
 If the received node is not a destination or an intermediate node that has a route to the 
destination then it will merge its own faulty list into the faulty list in the RREQ packet and then 
rebroadcast it. 
 A variable length list is added into RREQ packet in order to accommodate the faulty list. 
 A node rejects a route discovery and maintenance packet if its faulty table contains a node 
present in the source route of the received packet 
 After a node is added into the faulty list an explicit route error packet will be generated, 
which serves as an alert and sends it to the source of the monitored packet to inform about the 
misbehaving link. The source accordingly decides the routing path. 
  It also gives a chance to the selfish node after a certain timestamp but its reputation is 
made half.    
3.5 Correctness and Completeness of algorithm:- 
 
3.5.1 Packet Dropping:- 
 If the node can’t overhear the transmission then it regards it as packet dropping and 
accordingly step is taken. It can perform at least as good as NMCAM but with less power. 
3.5.2 Identity spoofing:- 
 Identity spoofing is checked by comparing node info in received packet with the NCL 
entry. 
3.5.3 Packet modification:- 
By checksum calculation and comparing it with stored one. 
3.5.4 Low power transmission:- 
 This is possible if the distance between the sender and receiver is more than that between 
observed node and overhearing node which is very rare as many nodes are overhearing 
simultaneously. 
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3.5.5 Colluding Packets:-  
 Due to the randomness of the selection of overhearing node the nodes can’t cooperate to 
mischief together. 
3.5.6 False Misbehavior:- 
 The honest nodes will not suffer in our system because the node reported 1
st
 time is taken 
as suspicious unlike the NMCAM. 
Also we give 2
nd
 chance to the selfish node after a certain time stamp. 
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CHAPTER 5 
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AND 
RESULTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 | P a g e  
 
5.1 Simulation Study 
      The proposed algorithm RSNAM was implemented in OMNET++ as an addition on to the DSR 
routing algorithm. OMNeT++ is a modular discrete event network simulation framework. This 
simulator is based on object oriented approach. We utilize the Random Way Point model for mobility 
of the nodes as it well depicts a real world situation. This mobility model is based on entity mobility 
model where the nodes move independent of each other. We have taken following parameters for 
implementation. 
Parameter Value 
Simulation Area 1600m*600m 
Simulation Time 3000s 
Number of nodes 100 
Node Mobility Random Way Point 
Pay load size 512B 
Positive Threshold 40 
Negative Threshold -40 
Initial Trust Value of a Node 0 
Carrier Frequency 2.4 GHz 
Mobility Speed 10 mps 
Transmitter Power 2.0Mw 
Snirthreshold 4dB 
Bitrate 54Mbps 
Thermal noise -110 dBm 
Sensitivity -90 dBm 
Send buffer timeout 300s 
 
5.1.1 Node Misbehaviour- 
  Many kinds of node misbehaviours were implemented. Some nodes participated in route 
discovery and route maintenance but did not do so in forwarding packet that too selectively. Some 
other totally did not participate in the process. Some others were designed to do packet modification. 
So that the implementation can be done properly 
5.1.2 Selection of Neighbours- 
   The selection of neighbours in detecting node misbehaviour was done in a random manner. 
The nodes were having a random number generator inside them so that every time they need to see its 
value before overhearing the channel. If the random number is evaluated as 0 then they were allowed 
to turn on their promiscuous mode to overhear the channel else they had to remain idle. This resulted 
in a lot of power saving of the nodes without affecting the fault detection. 
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5.1.3 Dynamic Source Routing [DSR]-    
The Dynamic Source Routing protocol (DSR) is a simple and efficient routing protocol designed 
specifically for use in multi-hop wireless ad hoc networks of mobile nodes.  DSR allows the 
network to be completely self-organizing and self-configuring, without the need for any existing 
network infrastructure or administration.  The protocol is composed of the two main mechanisms 
of "Route Discovery" and "Route Maintenance", which work together to allow nodes to discover 
and maintain routes to arbitrary destinations in the ad hoc network. All aspects of the protocol 
operate entirely on-demand, allowing the routing packet overhead of DSR to scale automatically to 
only that needed to react to changes in the routes currently in use.  The protocol allows multiple 
routes to any destination and allows each sender to select and control the routes used in routing its 
packets, for example for use in load balancing or for increased robustness. 
Other advantages of the DSR protocol include easily guaranteed loop-free routing, 
operation in networks containing unidirectional links, use of only "soft state" in routing, and very 
rapid recovery when routes in the network change.  The DSR protocol is designed mainly for 
mobile ad hoc networks of up to about two hundred nodes, and is designed to work well with even 
very high rates of mobility. 
 
5.1.4 Some Snapshots of Implementation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 4.1 Omnet++/Tkenv running in Express mode 
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Fig 4.2 Layered Structure of a Node 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 4.3 Pre-run Initialization 
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Fig 4.4 Running in Normal Mode (Mobility) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 4.5 Running in Normal Mode (DSR)  
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Fi 4.6 Running in Normal Mode (Data link layer ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 4.7 Running in Express Mode (Simulation time reached) 
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Fig 4.8 Graphical view of Nodes 
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5.2 Results 
Ideally, power consumed for a MANET in non-promiscuous mode is 73 watt/hr/node when 
we consider the node to be a simple laptop.  In promiscuous mode average power consumption is 
much higher. On an average let us say 105watt/hr/node. In case of previous algorithms based on 
neighborhood monitoring, all neighbors have to overhear the channel. So 100% nodes are to be in 
promiscuous mode consuming enormous power, but our proposed algorithm selects randomly 
some neighbors to overhear the channel. Hence nearly 50% (average case) of nodes are to be in 
promiscuous mode in this case. Rest of the nodes can be in non-promiscuous mode. 
We give the results in terms of following graphs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 5.9 comparison of packet received % in DSR, NMCAM and RSNAM 
 
 
 
 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
5 10 20 30 40
%
 o
f 
p
ac
ke
t 
re
ce
iv
e
d
 a
t 
d
e
st
in
at
io
n
 
 % of faulty node present in Network 
DSR
NMCAM
RSNAM
31 | P a g e  
 
 
Fig 5.10 Average power consumption comparison  
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CONCLUSION 
Previously, all research works show that how effectively a packet can be sent form source 
to the destination. Our aim here focuses on doing the same thing in a power effective manner. That 
is the packet loss ratio is minimized but in less power utilization by nodes. Hence we select some 
of the nodes in the neighborhood but not all to overhear the channel. These nodes are selected 
randomly. This makes the power consumption very less as compared to previous works done. 
FUTURE WORK 
Power efficiency may be reduced more than what we have done in this research and in 
future selfishness of a node can also be checked which yet to be done. To remove ambiguous 
collision and false misbehavior will be our research. 
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